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Implications for the U.S. Computer Industry
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Over the last twenty years, the computer industry has become global with respect tocomputer production as well as computer use, a trend which has raised concerns among
U.S. policymakers of hollowing out the industry and exporting employment. This paper uses
the framework of increasing returns to analyze the issue. It classifies market segments within
the computer industry, shows how the advent of the personal computer created these seg-
ments, examines how this change in the structure of the industry led to the evolution of an
Asia-Pacific production network, identifies company and country leadership in this network,
and evaluates the implications for the United States. It shows that some manufacturing em-
ployment, mainly in the decreasing returns segments of the industry, has shifted to the Asia-
Pacific region. However, it also shows that employment in some manufacturing segments and
in software and services, which are increasing returns or hybrid markets, has increased dra-
matically in the United States. It concludes that the global division of labor between the United
States and both companies and countries in the Asia-Pacific region has been largely positive
in that it has supported the continuing U.S. leadership position in the global computer
industry.
(Increasing and Decreasing Returns; Globalization; Computer Industry; Industrial Policy; Industry
Structure; Competition; Asia-Pacific Region)
Introduction
The computer industry was dominated from its incep-
tion until the 1980s by U.S. companies that developed
most of the important innovations, set key technical
standards, and controlled over two-thirds of the
world’s market for hardware, software, and services.
Periodic technology shifts such as the introduction of
the minicomputer and personal computer changed the
structure of the industry, but in each case it was Amer-
ican companies who were the industry leaders. And
since most computer production was done in the
United States, the success of U.S. companies translated
into corresponding benefits for the U.S. economy in the
form of jobs, value added, and a positive trade balance.
The personal computer revolution of the early 1980s
led to a new phenomenon in the industry, however.
PC makers turned to outside suppliers for most of their
inputs and moved some of their own production ac-
tivities offshore. So while U.S. companies remained the
leaders in most segments of the computer industry, the
actual production of computer equipment began shift-
ing away from United States, mostly to Asia. These
trends have raised concerns that in the new global di-
vision of labor, company and country success are no
longer synonymous.
The rapid globalization of the computer industry
also raised concerns that U.S. companies are at risk of
losing their industry leadership. Former U.S. Trade
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Representative Clyde Prestowitz predicted in 1989 that
the Japanese would take over the computer industry
as they had with televisions and other electronics
products (Business Week, 1989). The next year, Intel
CEO Andrew Grove forecast that Japanese companies
would control the majority of the PC market by 1992
(New York Times, 1990). These predictions failed to ma-
terialize because Japan’s computer industry was slow
to respond to the personal computer era, but the con-
cerns have not gone away. While some in the United
States celebrate the triumph of Silicon Valley, others
worry that the tables will be turned each time Japanese
companies launch a new drive into the U.S. computer
market.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a deeper un-
derstanding of the implications of globalization in the
computer industry for the United States. We seek to
develop a clearer picture of the computer industry’s
global production network, the concentration of that
network in Asia, the global division of labor within
that network, and the factors shaping the global in-
dustry structure. Thus, the paper looks at a key ques-
tion raised by the globalization of the industry: What
are the implications of so much production concen-
trated in the Asian countries for U.S. computer com-
panies and for the U.S. economy as a whole?
We hypothesize that globalization of production has
been based on a division of labor whereby U.S. com-
puter companies focus on increasing-returns market
segments and activities, and East Asian companies fo-
cus on decreasing-returns market segments and activ-
ities. A central question for future research is whether
the current balance of competition and cooperation be-
tween the United States and East Asia is sustainable,
or whether the industry’s own dynamics and the am-
bition of East Asian companies and countries will up-
set the balance with negative implications for the
United States. In order to assess this hypothesis, we
must analyze the structure of the computer industry,
the division of labor within the industry, and the re-
sulting competitive position of companies and
counties.
We begin by setting up a conceptual model of in-
creasing- and decreasing-returns businesses. We use
this model to characterize the computer industry in the
mainframe era and show IBM as a classic increasing-
returns business during its heyday. We then show how
the PC changed the structure of the industry from
large-scale, vertically-integrated firms to smaller firms
that are focused on products in horizontal industry
segments from microprocessors to operating systems
to end user applications. Using the conceptual model,
we show that this shift in industry structure created a
new alignment of increasing- and decreasing-returns
businesses based on those that were able to achieve a
monopoly in new industry segments through control
over standards versus those that were not able to do
so.
Within the framework of increasing versus decreas-
ing returns, we also identify several hybrid segments
in which U.S. companies have succeeded by concen-
trating on increasing-returns activities and outsourc-
ing decreasing-returns activities to Asian suppliers.
These corporate decisions helped create an East Asian
computer industry that both competes and cooperates
with U.S. multinationals in various markets. We look
at the impacts of Asia’s success in computers on the
U.S. computer industry and on employment in the
United States.
In addition, we move beyond theory and description
to develop a set of metrics for identifying increasing-
and decreasing-returns markets, based on commonly
available measures of corporate performance. These
measures could serve as the basis for future research
to quantify the nature of different segments of the com-
puter industry. Finally, we look at how both compa-
nies and countries can position themselves to partici-
pate in the increasing-returns industry segments in the
emerging network computing era.
Theoretical Framework
In order to analyze the structure of the computer in-
dustry, the division of labor within the industry, and
the competitive position of companies and countries,
we employ a framework that distinguishes between
increasing- and decreasing-returns markets and activ-
ities. The argument for increasing returns is that under
certain conditions, higher levels of production can re-
sult in lower unit costs, and hence, in increasing re-
turns to producers. The possibility of increasing re-
turns to scale has been posited as far back as Adam
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Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith and later econ-
omists such as Alfred Marshall (1890) and Allyn
Young (1928) noted that factors such as labor speciali-
zation and economies of scale could lead to increasing
returns to scale in manufacturing industries.
The idea that increasing returns were not only com-
mon but important in determining economic outcomes
was revived in the 1980s by economists such as
Nicholas Kaldor, Paul Romer, and W. Brian Arthur.
Kaldor (1985) argues that scale and specialization in
manufacturing can lead to increasing returns for the
largest and most advanced companies or regions, al-
lowing them to gain competitive advantage over time
at the expense of more backward competitors. Romer
(1990) points to technological progress as a key force
driving economic growth because it allows higher lev-
els of output for a given combination of labor and cap-
ital inputs. Technology can be codified as a set of in-
structions (e.g., recipes, designs, blueprints, software)
that can be used over and over at little additional cost.
The notion of increasing returns becomes much
more powerful when the element of time is introduced.
Rather than being dependent on a static production
function and a given level of technology diffusion, re-
turns to scale and economic outcomes in general are
seen as resulting from a dynamic path dependent pro-
cess. In the case of increasing-returns markets, we find
the tendency for “that which is ahead to get further
ahead, for that which loses advantage to lose further
advantage.” (Arthur 1994, p. 100). Success begets suc-
cess as the leaders expand their market and achieve
lower costs relative to competitors, enabling them to
expand their market share even further.
Increasing returns can also apply at the country or
regional level in explaining geographic concentration
and division of labor in an industry. Arthur (1994) and
Kaldor (1985) argue that industrial location decisions
depend not only on traditional economic factors such
as the presence of natural resources or the cost of labor.
Rather, they are also path dependent in that once one
company chooses a particular location, others will be
more likely to follow. As more companies gather in
one location, they tend to attract or create industry-
specific assets such as parts suppliers, specialized ser-
vices, and workers with specialized skills. Michael
Porter (1990) reviews a number of such industry clus-
ters, such as Silicon Valley, arguing that the presence
of such clusters are key sources of national economic
competitiveness.
Arthur (1994, 1996) argues that while decreasing re-
turns still apply to traditional bulk processing indus-
tries such as agriculture, mining, and most manufac-
turing, increasing returns are the norm in
knowledge-based industries such as computers, soft-
ware, pharmaceuticals, and aircraft. He points to three
conditions that account for increasing returns, each of
which applies particularly well to the computer indus-
try. The first is up-front costs—such products have
high R&D costs relative to their unit production costs,
e.g., the first disk of a new software program costs a
million dollars to produce, subsequent copies cost a
few dollars or less. The second is network effects—
products are more valuable when they are used by
large numbers of users and when they have a large
base of complementary assets. So as more people
adopt Windows, and more software vendors write
programs for the Windows platform, the value of be-
ing a Windows user increases. The third is customer
“groove-in,” sometimes referred to as “switching
costs” or “lock-in.” Here, customer training and or-
ganizational adaptation to a particular product makes
it costly to switch to another, even superior product.
This was a key to IBM’s decades-long dominance of
the mainframe industry; once companies adopted
IBM’s proprietary hardware and software, it was very
expensive and risky to switch.
In standards-based competition, which characterizes
important parts of the computer industry, path depen-
dence and increasing returns lead to a winner-take-all
(or most) outcome, rather than the more balanced com-
petitive equilibrium that would be expected in tradi-
tional industries. In the cases of VCRs and PCs, one
standard has come to achieve a monopoly position af-
ter competition among two or more technically similar
standards. Once a standard (such as VHS) or product
architecture (such as the IBM PC) got ahead in the mar-
ket, either due to chance or clever strategy, its lead was
magnified as users and creators of complementary as-
sets (e.g., video tapes or application software) gravi-
tated toward that standard (Cusumano 1992, Morris
and Ferguson 1993).
The computer industry has all three characteristics
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Table 1 Comparison of Increasing and Decreasing Returns Businesses
Dimensions Increasing Returns Decreasing Returns
Firm characteristics Knowledge-based assets
High risk, high cost R&D relative to production costs
High margin
Bulk-processing assets, plant & equipment
High process engineering costs
Low margin
Market structure Monopoly Oligopoly to ªopenº markets
Competitive success factors Control of technology standards
De®nition of new markets
Brand recognition
Quality
Product features
Cost ef®ciency throughout the value
Product and process technology
Speed to market
Entry barriers Established standards
Customer lock-in
MoneyÐcapital for large plant and equipment investments
TechnologyÐaccess to new process and product
technologies
Determinants of location Lead markets, with sophisticated users
Innovation-favorable environment
Availability of venture capital
Low cost labor
Skilled workers
Government incentives
Good infrastructure
Illustrative computer industry
sectors
Operating systems, microprocessors Floppy disk drives, CD-ROMs, motherboards, DRAM
of an increasing-returns industry, involving high up-
front costs, customer groove-in, and network external-
ities. Yet unlike the mainframe industry, in which IBM
reaped the benefits of increasing returns from its dom-
inant proprietary standards, the PC industry is much
more complex (Table 1). Specialization within the in-
dustry has divided it into numerous horizontal seg-
ments, with different competitive characteristics.
Knowledge-based products such as software and mi-
croprocessors tend to demonstrate increasing returns,
with near monopolies for Microsoft and Intel. Most
hardware production is more of a traditional bulk pro-
cessing industry, in which diminishing returns apply.
Some product categories such as PCs, printers, and
hard drives are hybrids that involve bulk processing
but include knowledge processing in the form of tech-
nology integration, branding, marketing, and logistics.
When we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
both companies and countries in the context of increas-
ing and decreasing returns, competition in the com-
puter industry can be understood in a different way.
We find that some companies have succeeded by being
highly efficient manufacturers of commodity hard-
ware, while others compete in the increasing-returns
world through innovation, market positioning, and the
ability to define new markets. A few have been good
at both. Likewise, some countries have become major
producers of commodity hardware, while others are
strong in software and services. The present position
and future competitiveness of both companies and
countries depend partly on their ability to develop and
enhance their capabilities in either or both those
worlds. However, because of the path-dependent na-
ture of the industry’s development, the possibilities for
both companies and countries at any time are shaped
and bound by what has gone before.
In this paper, we use the framework of increasing
versus decreasing returns to understand the historical
development and current structure of the computer in-
dustry and to analyze the nature of competition within
the industry.
Methodology
The methodology for conducting the research in this
paper included gathering primary and secondary data
from a variety of sources, reviewing academic and
popular books and journal articles, collecting news re-
ports, and conducting field interviews with over 600
people, mostly in the United States, Japan, Korea, Tai-
wan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, but also in China,
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Figure 1 Computer Industry Structure: The Mainframe Era
Source: Jason Dedrick and Kenneth L. Kraemer, 1998, Asia's Computer Chal-
lenge: Threat or Opportunity for the United States and the World? New York:
Oxford University Press. Adapted from Andrew S. Grove, 1996, Only the
Paranoid Survive, New York: Doubleday.
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, India, Australia,
and New Zealand. This research has been published
in country case studies (Gurbaxani et al. 1990, Dedrick
and Kraemer 1993a and 1993b, Kraemer and Dedrick
1993 and 1995, Kraemer et al. 1994, Dedrick et al. 1995),
cross-country comparisons of computer production
and use (Dedrick and Kraemer 1994, Kraemer and
Dedrick 1994), and a book (Dedrick and Kraemer
1998). This extensive research has led to a number of
conclusions about the nature of the computer industry
and the use of information technology throughout the
Asia-Pacific region. This paper builds on that research
to focus on the critical issue of how U.S. companies
have developed an Asian production network as a ba-
sis of competitive advantage and how they have main-
tained their competitiveness in the face of growing
competition from Asia.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we
review the changing of the computer industry from the
mainframe era to the PC era and show how the hori-
zontally segmented structure of the PC industry en-
couraged globalization and made possible the growth
of an Asian production network. Next, we segment the
PC industry along the lines of increasing and decreas-
ing returns to scale, characterizing the nature of com-
petition and identifying market leaders in each seg-
ment. We summarize the performance of U.S. and
Asian companies and countries in the computer in-
dustry and locate them along the dimensions of in-
creasing and decreasing returns. Finally, we analyze
the implications of the Asian production network and
consider possible competitive threats and opportuni-
ties that are arising from Asia for the U.S. computer
industry.
Increasing Returns and Computer
Industry Evolution
Increasing returns have been a feature of the computer
industry since its early days because one or two com-
panies have been able to control key standards and
translate that control into market dominance. During
the mainframe era, IBM enjoyed increasing returns as
a result of its market share and control of key stan-
dards, but in the PC era, IBM inadvertently ceded con-
trol over the key standards to Microsoft and Intel, who
have enjoyed the benefits of increasing returns ever
since.
Increasing Returns in the Mainframe Computing
Era
From the time of its inception in the 1940s until the
early 1980s, the computer industry was dominated by
IBM, which controlled nearly half the world market for
computers. This era of the centralized mainframe and
minicomputer was marked by a few large vertically-
integrated companies that produced many of their
own components, developed their own software, and
sold their computers through their own sales force
(Figure 1). IBM’s System/360 and System/370 became
the dominant platforms of the central computing era
and created an increasing-returns business for IBM.
IBM’s standard drove competing platforms to the
fringes of the market and became the safe choice for
computer users, as illustrated by the saying that “No
one ever got fired for buying IBM.” IBM was able to
develop its own peripherals and software for the Sys-
tem/360 and 370, and other companies developed
complementary assets in the form of plug-compatible
peripherals and application software that increased the
value of adopting the IBM standard. IBM enjoyed a
high level of customer lock-in as users invested mil-
lions of dollars in hardware and software, trained their
staff in IBM systems, and built entire business pro-
cesses around IBM standards. IBM’s solid growth and
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Table 2 Worldwide Market Share (%)
1975 1985 1990 1995
IBM 37 30 21 14
Companies 2±10 28 29 28 32
Companies 11±50 32 29 28 31
All others 3 18 23 23
Source: McKinsey & Company, Inc., The 1996 Report on the Computer
Industry (New York, NY: McKinsey & Company, Inc., 1996).
high-profit margins in the 1960s and 1970s were the
by-products of its ability to create and sustain increas-
ing returns in its business.
Although the U.S. government worried about IBM’s
dominant position, the company’s market dominance
carried with it a corresponding national advantage for
the United States. While IBM was an international
company—with marketing, production, and even
R&D operations around the world—the bulk of its
high-value activities remained in the United States.
Much of the market not controlled by IBM was in the
hands of other U.S. companies. With strong govern-
ment support, Japan’s computer makers came to con-
trol most of their domestic market, and Europe’s na-
tional champions remained competitive in their home
markets. But none of these companies could compete
with IBM outside their domestic markets.
Division of Labor in the PC Era: Increasing and
Decreasing Returns
The comfortable equilibrium enjoyed by IBM was
punctuated by the introduction of the personal com-
puter in the 1970s. The mainstream computer compa-
nies scoffed at the PC as an underpowered toy for peo-
ple who couldn’t afford a real computer. However,
when Apple Computer began selling PCs by the hun-
dreds of thousands, IBM responded quickly by devel-
oping its own PC.
Rather than build its PC entirely in-house, IBM fol-
lowed the lead of Apple, Commodore, and others by
assembling components from outside suppliers. The
de facto standards that allowed standardization of
components were set when IBM introduced its PC in
1981, which had an open architecture for which other
companies could develop complementary products
such as software and peripherals.
IBM made a critical strategic error, however, when
it contracted with Microsoft and Intel to develop the
operating system and microprocessors for the IBM-PC
and allowed them to license their technologies to other
companies. IBM soon faced hundreds of competitors
making IBM clones and selling them at cut-rate prices,
while Microsoft and Intel garnered the huge profit
margins that IBM had been accustomed to in the main-
frame business. While IBM had given away control of
its own creation, the open standards of the IBM-PC
architecture also lowered barriers to entry, allowing
literally thousands of new companies to get into the
computer business, making everything from chips to
systems to software.
The computer industry in the mainframe era had
been dominated by 10 giants who controlled 65% of
the market in 1975, with another 40 companies con-
trolling 32%. The category “all others” accounted for
just 3% of the market. By the 1990s, the industry was
populated by thousands of firms, including PC new-
comers such as Compaq, Apple, Dell, Microsoft, Nov-
ell, and Acer. IBM, which accounted for 37% of the
world computer market in 1975, had only 15% by 1994.
The “all others” category now accounted for 23% of
the market, its growth mirroring IBM’s declining mar-
ket share (Table 2).
The personal computer revolution led to a dramatic
change in the structure of the computer industry.
Whereas the mainframe computer industry consisted
of a few large, vertically-integrated firms such as IBM,
NCR, Fujitsu, and Hitachi, the PC industry was a hor-
izontally segmented industry with thousands of firms
competing at the different levels of the value chain
(Figure 2). Most companies specialize in one market
segment such as disk drives, PCs, or software, and
even the smallest companies could find niches pro-
ducing anything from cables and connectors to soft-
ware and services.
The shift from vertical integration to horizontal seg-
mentation in the computer industry had a profound
effect on the nature of competition in the industry. The
microprocessor and operating systems markets be-
came new increasing-returns businesses, with near-
monopoly industry structures. The application soft-
ware market has increasing-returns characteristics, but
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Figure 2 Computer Industry Structure: The PC Era
Source: Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998. Adapted from Grove, 1996.
most segments are more competitive because of lim-
ited customer lock-in and network effects, or they are
specialized markets in which increasing returns are
limited by the scale of the market. Most hardware seg-
ments of the industry have evolved into highly com-
petitive decreasing-returns businesses. A few seg-
ments, such as printers, PC systems, and services, are
hybrids that fall between purely increasing- and
decreasing-returns markets. Within the three catego-
ries, there were important distinctions among the
types of companies that succeeded, as well as among
which countries played important roles.
Before discussing the roles of different companies
and countries in the various segments of the industry,
it is valuable to provide some basic quantitative met-
rics that help distinguish among the categories. The
difficulty in quantifying increasing returns is that there
are very few markets that exhibit such pure increasing-
returns characteristics that the outcome is a monopoly
or near-monopoly market structure. In the PC indus-
try, only the operating system and microprocessor
markets have the near-monopoly structure expected in
increasing-returns markets.
Most segments of the industry fall somewhere be-
tween pure increasing and decreasing returns, and
some measure or set of measures is needed to place
them on that continuum. Market share is good initial
indicator of increasing or decreasing returns, but look-
ing at the competitive structure of a market segment
alone will not necessarily distinguish whether it has
increasing-returns characteristics. However, there are
measures of company and sector performance that
point to the presence of increasing returns. We propose
the following three metrics as indicators of returns to
scale in the computer industry:
• Market share of top company: This is an obvious
choice, as it indicates the degree to which “That which
is ahead tends to get further ahead,” in Brian Arthur’s
terms. If a dominant standard gains strong customer
lock-in and network externality effects, the company
controlling the standard is likely to have a very large
share of the market. Both Microsoft and Intel have over
80% of the operating system and microprocessor mar-
kets, respectively (Table 3). In PCs, market leader Com-
paq has just 12% of the market, while in floppy disk
drives Mitsumi has an 18% share; yet we have identi-
fied PCs as a hybrid market and floppy drives as a
decreasing-returns market based on the ability of PC
makers to achieve competitive edge through branding
and other increasing-returns activities. How, then, can
we distinguish more clearly where increasing returns
exist? To do so, we use a pair of financial indicators.
• Profit margins are highest in increasing-returns
markets. For instance, net income as percent of sales of
leading software and networking companies range
from 10% to as high as 25%, compared to PC and hard
disk drive makers, which rarely top 5%. Also, software
and datacommunications (networking companies such
as Cisco and Cabletron) earn a share of total computer
industry profits that is much higher than their share of
revenues. (Table 4 and 5).
• Return on equity: ROE is a measure of the ability of
firms to put capital to productive use, and the best way
to do so is by achieving increasing returns. One way
is obviously through dominating an increasing-returns
market, as in the case of Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco.
However, some companies are able to succeed even in
highly competitive markets by focusing on increasing-
returns activities. Thus, even in a low margin business
such as PCs, a company can earn a high return on in-
vestment by focusing on high value knowledge activ-
ities and leaving capital intensive bulk processing to
its suppliers. This is the case with Dell, whose net mar-
gins are only 5% to 6%, but whose ROE in the 1990s
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Table 4 Pro®t Margins and Return on Equity of Companies by
Industry Segments
Industry Segment
Net Income as %
of Revenues,
1993±1996
Average Return on Equity
Increasing Returns
Microsoft 25.3 28.5
Intel 23.2 28.8
Cisco 22.6 34.1
Oracle 13.7 35.6
Adobe 12.0 14.2
Hybrid
Compaq 6.7 19.9
Dell 3.5 26.4
Gateway 4.8 35.3
EDS 6.8 16.8
Computer Sciences Corp. 3.5 10.8
Decreasing Returns
Samsung Display Devices
(Korea) 5.3 n.a.
Acer (Taiwan) 4.4 8.7 (1996)
Mitac (Taiwan) 1.5 n.a.
FIC (Taiwan) 4.1 n.a.
Sources: McKinsey & Company, Report on the Computer Industry, 1993
and 1996.
Table 5 Share of Total Industry Revenue vs. Pro®ts for Industry
Segments, 1995
Industry Segment Share of Revenues Share of Pro®ts
Hardware 61.8 29.6
Software 13.7 38.6
Services 19.6 15.6
Datacomm 5.0 16.3
Source: McKinsey & Company, The 1996 Report on the Computer Indus-
try.
has matched that of monopolists Intel and Microsoft
(Table 4).
The following sections provide more detail on the
character of decreasing-returns, increasing-returns,
and hybrid markets, and the role of the United States
and Asia in those markets.
Decreasing-Returns Markets
Most hardware markets operate on the basis of de-
creasing returns to scale. The differences among the
various market segments are important, however, as
they greatly influence what types of companies and
countries are most competitive in each segment. For
instance, some industries, such as DRAMs (Table 3,
column 5) and flat-panel displays (column 6) are very
capital-intensive, high-volume commodity industries,
with little differentiation among products. These in-
dustries tend to favor large diversified companies who
can have the financial resources to make large invest-
ments in R&D and production facilities, and who can
weather temporary downturns in the market. Not sur-
prisingly, the DRAM and flat-panel industries are
dominated by large Japanese and Korea electronics
conglomerates such as Toshiba, NEC, Fujitsu, Sam-
sung, Hyundai, and LG Electronics. Most U.S. semi-
conductor makers have abandoned the DRAM market,
although Micron and IBM remain active. The flat-panel
display market, built on LCD technology developed in
the United States, has been almost completely ceded
to Japanese companies, with Korean companies just re-
cently entering the market in large scale. Now a few
Taiwanese companies are entering the DRAM and
LCD markets as well.
Other segments of the hardware industry follow dif-
ferent rules, however. Some—such as motherboards,
add-on cards, and a variety of peripherals and com-
ponents—are highly price sensitive and place a pre-
mium on speed-to-market of new product generations.
They require flexibility rather than scale in production.
These segments favor the many small- and medium-
sized Taiwanese companies, who compete on the basis
of speed, flexibility, the ability to squeeze costs to the
bone, and close ties to global markets via the overseas
Chinese network.1 While data are not available on
motherboard market share by company, most of the
major motherboard producers supplying the global PC
1Large numbers of Taiwanese engineers work for U.S. companies.
These “human resources on deposit” serve as sources of market and
technology information for Taiwanese companies who are linked by
family or alumni networks. Some are also lured back to work for
Taiwanese companies, bringing their knowledge and connections
with them.
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industry are Taiwanese companies such as Asustek
and FIC.
There are also market segments based on more sta-
ble technologies in which price is the determining fac-
tor, such as monitors, floppy disk drives, CD-ROM
drives (columns 7–9), keyboards, cables, and connect-
ors. Most of these are made by Japanese, Korean, and
Taiwanese companies, but production is often done in
low-cost locations such as China or Southeast Asia.
Japanese companies still produce most of the key high-
value components for products such as large monitors
and CD-ROMs and either produce the final products
offshore or sell the components to Korean and Tai-
wanese companies that produce the end product. U.S.
companies are again virtually absent in these segments
of the market.
While the various hardware markets have quite dif-
ferent industry structures, and have favored different
companies and countries, they all are marked by the
characteristics of diminishing returns. Competition is
intense, margins are thin, and if one company starts to
get ahead, it attracts even more aggressive attacks by
its competitors. For example, the Japanese giants who
had driven most of their American competitors out of
the DRAM industry in the 1980s were unable to enjoy
the fruits of their victory as the Koreans soon entered
the market with huge volumes of production. Prices
for DRAM are now so low that it is questionable if
anyone is making a profit in the industry. The same
pattern may be repeated in flat-panel displays as Ko-
rean companies ramp up production, followed by Tai-
wanese companies in the near future. As we have seen,
U.S. companies have abandoned most of these
decreasing-return markets altogether, finding them
not profitable enough to justify continued
participation.
Increasing-Returns Markets
In contrast to the world of decreasing returns, which
is dominated by Asian companies, the increasing-
returns segments of the industry are completely under
the control of U.S. companies. The classic case of an
increasing-returns business is the operating systems
market (Table 3, column 1). Microsoft gained a critical
first-mover advantage when IBM chose MS-DOS as the
operating system for the original IBM-PC. Ensuing
Windows operating systems cost millions each to de-
velop, but the marginal cost of each new copy was just
a few dollars. Meanwhile, as more users adopted Win-
dows and more software developers wrote applica-
tions for Windows, the marginal value of each new
copy of Windows actually grew, due to the external
economies provided by a larger user base and a larger
pool of complementary assets (third-party software,
add-on hardware, distribution channels, user
experience).
Application software also functions as an increasing-
returns business, but with much greater competition
in most market segments than is seen in the operating
systems business. While the cost structure of applica-
tion software is similar in terms of high up-front costs
and low marginal costs, the customer lock-in effect is
less pronounced. It is easier and cheaper to switch
from WordPerfect to Word than it is to switch from
Macintosh to Windows. However, Microsoft has been
quite successful in extending its dominant market po-
sition into the critical office application market by bun-
dling its software into the Microsoft Office suite. This
application suite costs less than buying separate ap-
plications and offers some product integration among
the component applications.
The other industry segment clearly characterized by
increasing returns is the microprocessor market (col-
umn 2), where Intel has enjoyed a market share of over
70% since IBM selected its processors for the original
IBM-PC. Through its ability to control many hardware
standards for the PC (and aggressive protection of its
intellectual property), Intel has created a counterpart
to the Windows franchise in operating systems. While
it does have competitors in the x86 microprocessor
market, Intel has actually been able to increase its share
of that market over time, topping 80% in 1996. Thanks
to the huge profits garnered in this increasing-returns
market, Intel can afford to make heavy investments in
R&D and production capacity in order to stay ahead
of competitors technologically and lower its produc-
tion costs. It has also spent heavily on its “Intel Inside”
campaign to create a franchise based on branding as
well as architectural standards.
Hybrid Markets
In between the clearly defined increasing- and
decreasing-returns markets, there are a few market
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segments that show characteristics of both worlds.
These “hybrid” industries might start out as
increasing-returns businesses and mature into
decreasing-returns businesses, as was the case with the
original IBM-PC. Or they can start out as decreasing-
returns businesses, but be transformed into increasing-
returns by a change in the market or by management
strategies that recast a company’s role in the market.
For instance, Microsoft initially developed separate
custom versions of DOS for different PC makers before
realizing the power of creating (and controlling) one
common version which would run on all IBM-com-
patible PCs. Likewise, Intel’s original 4004 micropro-
cessor was developed as a custom product for a Japa-
nese calculator company, Busicom, and then was
transformed into a general purpose microprocessor.
Within the computer industry there are several mar-
kets that currently can be classified as hybrids. One is
the information services business, which includes cus-
tom programming, systems integration, outsourcing,
network services, and maintenance. The information
services business has been dominated by domestic
companies in most countries. The need for close inter-
action with customers, local language skills, and inti-
mate knowledge of local business culture has put even
large companies such as EDS and Computer Sciences
Corporation at a disadvantage outside the U.S market.
No matter how good they are in the United States,
these companies have to hire and train local people in
each market and compete against local companies who
have access to the same talent. The main advantage of
U.S. companies is their size and ability to serve the
global needs of large multinationals. For instance, IBM
has marketed information services around the world
by utilizing its global data network and has taken ad-
vantage of local capabilities developed over the years
to support its hardware business. Still, there are lim-
ited network externalities available in the services in-
dustry, because the business is based mainly on pro-
viding custom solutions for each client’s needs.
Some of the most interesting hybrid industries, and
the most competitive for U.S. companies, are found in
the hardware industry. Here, U.S. companies face di-
rect competition from powerful Japanese firms, many
of whom are successful in a variety of consumer elec-
tronics and components markets. Most notable among
these are the PC systems, printer, and hard disk drive
industries (Table 3, columns 3–5). PCs are seen by
many to be the ultimate commodity product, with
thousands of producers all making nearly indistin-
guishable products from the same array of compo-
nents. Price competition is fierce, and market share
success is measured in one- or two-percent gains. The
PC industry would seem to be a perfect fit for the Jap-
anese and other Asian companies that have come to
dominate most of the commodity hardware industry,
yet U.S. companies hold four of the top five positions
in world markets.
Likewise, in spite of Japan’s strong position in the
printer market and its companies’ strengths in related
optoelectronics products such as cameras and copiers,
it is the U.S. company Hewlett-Packard that controls
nearly half the U.S. market (and data from earlier years
show a similar picture for global markets). Finally, U.S.
companies have maintained a dominant position in the
hard disk drive (HDD) industry, in contrast to the near
total control by Japanese companies in floppy disk
drives and CD-ROM rives.
Strategies of U.S. Companies to Compete in Hybrid
Markets
The ability of U.S. companies to succeed against the
odds in a few key high volume hardware industries
provides perhaps the most interesting story of the
global PC industry. It also shows most clearly the com-
plementary relationship between U.S. companies in
hybrid markets and the Asian production network.
Based on the criteria presented in Table 1, the PC,
printer, and HDD industries would appear to fall
within the domain of decreasing returns. They are not
marked by high up-front costs relative to unit produc-
tion costs, they provide little or no opportunity to es-
tablish defensible standards, and they have no strong
customer groove-in effects. A user can switch effort-
lessly from a Compaq to a Dell PC or from a Hewlett-
Packard to an Epson printer. A PC maker likewise can
change hard drive suppliers from one product gener-
ation to another with little difficulty. Yet in each of
these products, U.S. companies have maintained their
leadership in the face of supposedly superior Asian
manufacturing prowess. How have they done so?
The answer is that U.S. companies have focused on
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increasing-returns activities within these industries
and turned over the decreasing-returns activities to
other (usually Asian) companies. U.S. PC makers such
as Dell, Compaq, and Hewlett-Packard have concen-
trated their own efforts on product design, marketing,
brand development, distribution, and customer ser-
vice. These are knowledge-based activities that enable
them to distinguish themselves and gain a sustainable
competitive advantage. They have been able to achieve
tremendous leverage by focusing on their own
strengths and integrating the capabilities of external
resources to get the right products into the right mar-
kets at the right time. For some PC models, the U.S.
company literally never takes possession of the PC.
The Taiwanese supplier designs the product to meet
specifications set by the U.S. vendor, builds the ma-
chines, ships them to the distributor, and sometimes
even provides service and support. By integrating the
capabilities of Asia with their own internal competen-
cies, U.S. PC makers have kept an edge over their more
vertically-integrated Japanese competitors, who until
recently tried to keep most of their production in-
house and had trouble keeping up with the rapid prod-
uct cycles of the industry.
In some ways, PC makers add the least obvious
value to the PC industry. They spend little on R&D
and depend heavily on component suppliers to pro-
vide the continuous technological progress on which
the industry depends. Rather than manufacturing or
technology, the keys to success in the PC industry now
involve mostly other forms of innovation, namely mar-
keting, distribution, customer service, and logistics.
Companies such as Dell, Micron, and Gateway 2000
have grown rapidly with a build-to-order direct sales
mode that offers additional value to customers in the
form of customized products. This strategy, when im-
plemented effectively, also reduces costs by eliminat-
ing inventory throughout the value chain.
Compaq (before its acquisition of DEC), Dell, and
Gateway 2000 are all tightly focused on the PC busi-
ness and realize that their corporate survival depends
on continued innovation in the PC industry. The other
big U.S. players are IBM and Hewlett-Packard, both of
which are diversified computer makers, but each has
set up PC divisions that operate primarily as indepen-
dent units. Each of these companies has succeeded
through a combination of innovative business models
and skillful execution in a highly unpredictable
industry.
Similar stories can be told in the printer and hard
disk drive markets, where U.S. companies have fo-
cused on design, marketing, and technological inno-
vations while moving production to Asia to minimize
manufacturing costs. The main competition in hybrid
markets is between U.S. and Japanese firms. Other
Asian producers have become valuable partners, co-
operating rather than competing with U.S. companies.
They have taken over much of the decreasing-returns
side of hardware production by serving as suppliers
and manufacturers for U.S. firms, while U.S. compa-
nies have concentrated on the knowledge-based as-
pects of the business such as design, marketing, and
integration of the entire production process. By con-
trast, Japanese companies have not been innovative in
marketing or other distribution to compete more effec-
tively outside Japan, and while they are now starting
to tap the Asian production network, they have done
so reluctantly. Rather than fully exploit the capabilities
of Asia, they have often tried to relocate their Japanese
supplier networks to other locations in Asia and have
given limited responsibilities to local managers. This
gap in innovation and integration, along with a tighter
product focus, has so far enabled U.S. companies to
protect their markets against Japanese competitors.
In summary, U.S. companies have been able to main-
tain a strong position in hybrid markets by focusing
on the increasing-returns activities such as design,
marketing, brand promotion, and customer service,
and developing innovations such as build-to-order
production and online sales. Their competitive edge is
based mainly on knowledge processing, while they de-
pend on Asian partners with strong manufacturing
skills to carry out most of the decreasing-returns activ-
ities within the value chain. The most successful U.S.
companies have also developed innovative logistics,
distribution, and information systems to create virtu-
ally integrated production networks that span the Pa-
cific. This integrated production network has evolved
over the past 20 years as a result of industry dynamics
and the efforts of Asian governments to promote com-
puter production.
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Emergence of the Asian Production
Network
Although IBM operated globally during the main-
frame era, most computer companies produced in their
home countries, where their markets were concen-
trated. However, the PC industry, with its much higher
production volumes and reliance on standardized
components, created opportunities for specialization
and network economies in production. In its efforts to
bring the PC to market quickly, IBM turned to Asian
firms to supply a number of components. By doing so,
it created a supply base that was available to other PC
makers as they entered the market.
The decentralized production structure of the PC in-
dustry opened the door for new companies and coun-
tries to enter the industry. U.S. PC makers needed low-
cost, reliable sources of components and peripherals
and turned to Japan and East Asia, with their well-
developed electronics and components industries. U.S.
companies also wanted to move labor-intensive pro-
duction to lower-wage locations and needed cheap
sources of simple components that were becoming too
expensive to source from Japan. Their search led them
to Asia’s newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong,
which had experience making consumer electronics
and electronic components. For instance, IBM con-
tracted with Taiwan’s Tatung to produce monitors for
the original IBM-PC.
At the same time, those countries were looking to
move into higher technology industries and saw the
emerging PC industry as providing just such an op-
portunity. The governments of Korea, Taiwan, and
Singapore all enacted national strategies to promote
the creation of PC industries in the early 1980s and
supported them with various grants, loans, and incen-
tives to promote investment, infrastructure develop-
ment, R&D, technology transfer, and education and
training. This confluence of interests between U.S.
companies and Asian countries led to a rapid growth
in computer production in Asia, as U.S. companies de-
veloped a vast supply and manufacturing network
throughout the region.
Characteristics of the Asian Production Network
What has evolved over the last 15 years is a vast pro-
duction system stretching throughout the Asia-Pacific
region. Each key country in Asia has established a
unique place for itself based on its national capabilities
(e.g., technology leadership, manufacturing skills, sup-
ply infrastructure, or managerial abilities), its inherent
economic advantages (e.g., large domestic market,
low-cost labor and land, closeness to a large market),
and government policies that support industry and en-
hance national capabilities.
Each country specializes in particular segments of
the computer industry that fit its own capabilities and
industry structure (Table 6). For instance, Japan util-
izes its superior technology and manufacturing skills
to dominate high-end hardware markets such as flat-
panel displays and various materials, components, and
production equipment. On the other hand, Japan re-
mains weak in software and new product develop-
ment, as its bureaucratic corporate structures are ob-
stacles to entrepreneurship and innovation. Japanese
companies are also being challenged by Korean and
Taiwanese competitors in a number of key hardware
markets.
Korea’s industry structure is similar to that of Japan,
with the computer and electronics industries domi-
nated by large conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyun-
dai, and LG Electronics, whose size and manufacturing
abilities enable them to compete directly with Japan in
high-volume commodity hardware. Korea is already a
leader in DRAMs and monitors and is now moving
aggressively into flat-panel displays, another Japanese
stronghold. However, Korean companies have had lit-
tle success in PC systems outside their home market
and have failed to penetrate markets for peripherals
and components beyond DRAMs and monitors. These
failures are largely a result of the sluggish response by
Korea’s huge companies to the rapid product cycles
that mark much of the PC industry.
The most broadly successful Asian country in the PC
industry has been Taiwan. Taiwan leads the world in
production of notebook PCs, monitors, motherboards,
scanners, keyboards, and a variety of other hardware
products. The global PC industry has come to rely
heavily on Taiwan’s many small- and medium-sized
companies to provide the speed and flexibility that are
necessary to keep up in the PC market. The Taiwanese
government has provided invaluable assistance to its
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Table 6 Country Roles in the Global Production System
Country Capabilities Role in Global Production Systems
United States Design, marketing
technology leadership, control of key PC standards.
• Leading supplier of PCs, microprocessors software, printers,
networking equipment.
• Lead market
Japan Technology leadership in key components, high quality
manufacturing
• Supplier of leading-edge components and peripherals.
• Leader in notebook PCs.
Korea Low-cost, high-volume manufacturing • Major supplier of DRAMs.
• Producer of trailing-edge monitors and ¯at-panel displays.
Taiwan Design, ¯exible manufacturing, entrepreneurial capabilities,
close ties to U.S. industry, large supplier base
• Major producer of a wide variety of components and
peripherals.
• OEM supplier to global industry
Hong Kong Management, excellent infrastructure, unique legal relationship
to China.
• Gateway to China, conduit for trade, technology and capital
¯ows.
• Business management for production operations in China.
Singapore Precision manufacturing, excellent business environment and
infrastructure, supplier base.
• Key production and engineering site for disk drive industry,
PC and printer production, sound card leader.
• Regional business hub for MNCs.
Source: Kraemer and Dedrick, 1998.
entrepreneurial companies, conducting R&D in gov-
ernment research institutions, providing market intel-
ligence, and developing the Hsinchu Science-Based In-
dustrial Park as a center for high-tech research and
production.
The other great success story in Asia’s computer in-
dustry has been Singapore. The tiny city-state has be-
come the hard disk drive capital of the world, account-
ing for over 40% of global production, and is also a
major producer of PCs, printers, and—increasingly—
semiconductors. Unlike Taiwan, however, Singapore’s
success is not built on the basis of strong local com-
panies but relies on production by foreign multina-
tional corporations (MNCs).2 Singapore serves as a
hub for the regional production networks of such lead-
ing companies as Seagate, Western Digital, Hewlett-
Packard, and Compaq in Southeast Asia. It also has
been the most enthusiastic user of information tech-
nology in Asia and has ambitious plans to become an
“Intelligent Island” whose competitiveness will be
based on the presence of a world class information in-
frastructure. Singapore’s government has also played
2The exception to Singapore’s MNC dependence is the sound card
industry, where local companies Creative Technology and Aztech
are the world leaders.
a key role in attracting MNCs and encouraging them
to upgrade their activities in Singapore, developing in-
frastructure, training computer professionals, and pro-
moting IT use throughout the economy.
Hong Kong plays a unique role in the Asian pro-
duction network. Although there is little computer
production in Hong Kong itself, the territory serves
both as a gateway for trade and investment to China
and as manager for an extensive production network
in southern China. Numerous companies maintain
managerial functions such as finance, marketing, and
logistics in Hong Kong while operating factories in
China. These include companies owned by Hong Kong
and foreign MNCs, as well as Taiwanese companies
who cannot invest directly in China.
Specialization within the Asian production network
can be seen in Table 7, showing the share of global
production in various market segments. Korea spe-
cializes in monitors and DRAM; Japan in notebook PCs
and DRAM; Taiwan specializes in PCs, monitors, and
motherboards; and Singapore in hard disk drives.
Specialization within the Asian production network,
and between the United States and Asia, cannot be ex-
plained simply by static factors such as industry struc-
ture or policy environment, however. The nature of
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Table 7 Computer Hardware Market Shares for NIEs, 1995
% Share of Global Production of:
Desktop
PCs
Notebook
PCs Monitors Motherboards*
Hard Disk
Drives** DRAMs
Korea 5 1 25 n.a. 2 30
Taiwan 10 27 57 65 0 5
Singapore 3 12 5 n.a. 50 n.a.
Japan 5 27 10 n.a. 24 50
* Includes merchant sales only. Does not include captive production by
PC vendors.
** Final assembly.
Sources:ÐMarket Intelligence Centre/Institute for Information Industries
(MIC/III), Asia IT Report, February 1996 and November 1996 and data pro-
vided to authors.
ÐElectronics Industry Association of Korea, '95 Statistics of Electronic
Industries
ÐPeter Gourevitch, Roger E, Bohn and David McKendrick, 1997, ªWho
Is Us? The Nationality of Production in the Hard Disk Drive Industry,º La
Jolla, CA: Graduate School of International Relations and Paci®c Studies,
University of California, San Diego.
this network has evolved over time in a path-
dependent process, whereby decisions made at one
time shape the environment in which future invest-
ments are made. Analyzing the specialization patterns
of Singapore’s and Taiwan’s computer industries,
Wong Poh-Kam (1995) focuses on the dynamic inter-
action of three factors: entrepreneurial innovation,
state intervention, and agglomeration of comparative
advantage. For instance, the entrepreneurial decisions
in the 1970s by foreign companies, including camera
maker Rollei and floppy disk drive maker Tandon, to
locate in Singapore helped Singapore develop capabil-
ities in mechanical engineering and a supply base of
metal parts and electrical components. When Singa-
pore’s Economic Development Board (EDB) began
promoting the computer industry, it was able to con-
vince Seagate to locate its assembly operations in Sin-
gapore. Seagate was followed to Singapore by some of
its suppliers, further improving Singapore’s supply
base, and Singapore’s workers gained experience and
skills in disk drive production.
This agglomeration of capabilities encouraged EDB
to pursue other disk drive makers, and over time a
virtuous cycle kicked in, with more suppliers coming
to Singapore, followed by more drive makers, with
Singapore’s workers gaining higher levels of special-
ized technical skills. This process was path-dependent,
in that decisions made over time were dependent on
earlier choices by companies and the government. The
result of the process was the creation of an industry
cluster, which propelled Singapore to world leader-
ship in disk drive production. The capabilities of this
cluster have locked in Singapore’s position as a critical
cog in the industry, even after rising wages made Sin-
gapore an unlikely location for such a labor-intensive
industry. This type of path-dependent development
not only shapes future opportunities for countries such
as Singapore and Taiwan, but it also creates barriers to
entry for newcomers who are not currently involved
in the industry.
Impacts of the Asian Production
Network on the United States
We have seen that U.S. companies dominate the
increasing-returns businesses of the PC industry and
that they have sustained their leadership in a number
of hybrid markets by focusing on increasing-returns
activities and forging partnerships with Asian manu-
facturers. But what have been the implications of this
division of labor, and what are the prospects for the
future?
Company Competitiveness, Production and
Employment
The shift of computer production to Asia caused great
concern for a time that American companies were put-
ting U.S. leadership at risk by hollowing out the U.S.
manufacturing base. Japanese manufacturers had al-
ready used their control over key components and
manufacturing technologies to drive most of their
American competitors out of the consumer electronics
industry. By the end of the 1980s, many analysts were
predicting that Japan would use its control over pro-
duction of memory chips and other components to
eclipse the United States in computer hardware as
well.
Ironically, the U.S. computer industry avoided the
fate of the consumer electronics industry partly by tap-
ping the capabilities of other Asian countries to
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Table 8 Computer Industry Employment, 1985±1994 (Thousands)
Industry segment 1985 1990 1994
Hardware 350 294 249
Software and services 600 800 1,100
Source: Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998.
Figure 4 Company vs. Country Position in the Computer Industry
Note: Vendor is headquarters of company selling the product. Production is
where the product is made.
Sources: McKinsey & Company, Inc., The 1996 Report on the Computer
Industry (New York: McKinsey & Company, Inc., 1996). Reed Electronics
Research, Yearbook of World Electronics Data, various years (Oxford: Reed
Electronics Research)
Figure 3 Computer Production in the United States, Japan, and East
Asia
Source: Reed Electronics Research, Yearbook of World Electronics Data,
various years (Oxford: Reed Electronics Research). Note: 1997 is an esti-
mate.
counter the manufacturing prowess of the Japanese
(Borrus 1997). By diversifying their supplier base and
moving production to low-cost locations in Asia, U.S.
companies avoided dependence on Japanese suppliers
and remained competitive against Japanese computer
hardware makers.
In the PC industry’s new global division of labor,
U.S. companies focused on their strengths in software,
product planning and design, distribution, and mar-
keting and leveraged the manufacturing capabilities of
Asia to maintain their leadership in the industry. As a
result, computer production soared in the East Asian
NIEs (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong),
from US$3.4 billion in 1985 to US$46 billion in 1995
(Figure 3). While the United States and Japan remained
the largest producers of computer hardware, most of
the growth in production was taking place in the Asian
NIEs.
Looked at another way, U.S.-based companies still
account for 65% of the world’s computer hardware
sales, but the percentage of computer hardware pro-
duced in North America has declined steadily, from
50% in 1985 to 28% in 1995. Meanwhile, the share pro-
duced in Asia grew from 23% to 47%, virtually replac-
ing U.S. production (Figure 4).
As U.S. companies have shifted production to Asia,
there has been concern about the loss of jobs in the
United States. The question is whether U.S. companies
are succeeding, but without corresponding economic
benefits to the United States. The evidence, as shown
in Table 5, is that employment in hardware production
has in fact declined since the mid-1980s, but it is largely
due to the downsizing of companies such as IBM and
DEC. Yet even this minor downturn in hardware em-
ployment has been accompanied by a dramatic rise in
the number of jobs in software and services (Table 8).
Thus, the evidence shows that the U.S. emphasis on
increasing-returns industries and activities has paid off
for U.S. workers. Also, U.S. hardware production be-
gan to grow rapidly in 1994 after stagnating for almost
a decade (Figure 3), partly as a result of PC makers
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Table 9 Company and Country Position in the Global Computer Industry
Increasing Returns Decreasing Returns Hybrids
Position of companies by
market segment
U.S. companies dominate in operating
systems, packaged software and
microprocessors.
Japanese and Koreans lead in DRAMs
and LCDs, CD-ROM drives, ¯oppy
drives. Taiwanese strong in
motherboards, add-on cards,
monitors, and other components.
Japanese dominate key upstream
technologies. Singapore companies
lead in sound cards.
U.S. companies lead in PCs, printers
and hard drives with competition
from Japanese companies. U.S.
companies are leaders in
information services, with local
®rms strong in other national
markets.
Country location of activities
in the value chain
Software development,
microprocessor design,
engineering and wafer fabrication
in U.S. chip assembly and testing
in Malaysia, Thailand, HK/China,
and other developing countries.
R&D, design, high-value components
mainly in Japan. High volume
production in Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore. Low-end
assembly in SE Asia, China, and
other developing countries.
R&D, design, and high-end
production in U.S. and Japan.
Engineering and production in U.S.,
Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore.
Production moving to developing
countries. Information services
provided in local markets.
Figure 5 Company Competitiveness: Location of Headquarters
moving production closer to the end user to support
build-to-order manufacturing. It is likely that hard-
ware employment has recovered some of its earlier
losses in recent years.
Competitive Position in Increasing- and
Decreasing-Returns Markets
Using the framework of increasing and decreasing re-
turns, we have delineated the division of labor and
competitive environment within the global computer
industry. Table 9 and Figures 5 and 6 summarize these,
showing the competitive position of companies and
the location of production activities by country.
Both Table 9 (first row) and Figure 5 show that U.S.
companies dominate in the increasing-returns seg-
ments of the market, with little competition from Asia.
Japanese, Taiwanese, and Korean companies dominate
in highly competitive decreasing-returns segments
such as keyboards, monitors, and DRAMs. U.S. and
Japanese companies compete in the key hybrid seg-
ments, with U.S. companies currently holding the
edge. So far, there is little competition from the rest of
Asia in the hybrid markets. Singapore’s absence from
Figure 5 reflects the near absence of Singaporean com-
panies, in spite of the island’s importance as a produc-
tion platform.
Table 9 (second row) and Figure 6 show how the
division of labor within the production network has
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Figure 6 Country Competitiveness: Location of Production Activities
been organized to take advantage of local capabilities,
wherever they exist. Increasing-returns activities such
as R&D, product design and engineering, and software
development are concentrated in the United States and
Japan in order to take advantage of those countries’
technological capabilities, human resources, and large
domestic markets. Capital-intensive activities such as
DRAM and LCD production are mostly located in Ja-
pan and Korea, where companies can raise large sums
of capital and have access to necessary engineering
skills. Actual production of PCs, printers, mother-
boards, add-on cards, and hard drives are done mostly
in Taiwan and Singapore, which have the flexibility,
technical skills, and strong supplier bases to get prod-
ucts from design to volume production very quickly.
Labor-intensive activities such as assembly of simpler
products and components generally take place in
Southeast Asia and China, where large pools of low-
cost, well-educated workers are available. The multi-
ple overlapping ovals in the lower section of Figure 6
show how competitive the decreasing-returns indus-
tries are becoming as more countries vie for a position
at the lower levels of the industry.
This picture is merely a mid-1990s snapshot, how-
ever, and continues to change. The East Asian NIEs are
climbing the technology ladder to carry out more
R&D, design, and engineering, while the emerging
NIEs such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and China
attempt to go beyond labor-intensive activities and de-
velop their own technological capabilities. This process
has put enormous pressure on everyone involved, par-
ticularly in the hardware industry. Japan finds itself
losing market share in DRAMs, monitors, LCDs, and
other hardware markets to Korean companies. Tai-
wanese companies are also moving into some of those
market segments, often in partnerships with U.S., Eu-
ropean, and Japanese companies. Battles over market
share are fierce and profit margins are driven to almost
nil, just as the theory of decreasing returns would
predict.
Future Competition in Increasing-Returns Markets
The U.S. advantage in increasing-returns markets is
largely a result of the historical development of the
industry. The computer industry was created in the
United States with early support from the U.S. govern-
ment in the form of R&D subsidies and large military
procurements. The United States has remained the
leading user market, both in size and sophistication,
and has provided fertile ground for development of
innovative products and services, which can then be
sold to global markets. IBM, along with Microsoft, In-
tel, and the U.S. PC industry, was successful in estab-
lishing the IBM/Wintel architecture as a global PC
standard; and no one in the United States or elsewhere
has produced a viable challenger to that standard.
Non-U.S. companies have had little success in
increasing-returns markets. A few, such as Germany’s
SAP, Canada’s Corel, and Japan’s Just Systems, have
developed successful software applications. But in
spite of various European and Japanese government
initiatives to promote software production, U.S. com-
panies still control about 75% of the software industry
overall and have virtually 100% of the operating sys-
tem market. The story is similar in microprocessors,
where Intel’s competition, limited as it is, comes from
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U.S. companies such as AMD, Cyrix, Motorola, and
IBM.
For the time being, almost everyone seems to agree
that a challenge to U.S. control of computer standards
and increasing-returns markets is unlikely in the near
future. The United States is by far the largest IT market
and is the most dynamic. The emerging network era
of computing is being defined in the United States by
established companies such as Microsoft, IBM, and
Sun, and by newer entrants such as Cisco, Netscape,
Yahoo!, and Amazon.com. As much as ever, new mar-
kets are being defined and new standards established
in the United States which points to continued lead-
ership for U.S. companies in increasing-returns
markets.
Conclusions
In the final analysis we find that Asian companies and
countries represent both opportunities and challenges
for the U.S. computer industry. U.S. computer makers
can continue to rely on East Asia as a production base
and as a reliable, cost-efficient supplier of parts, com-
ponents, peripherals, and OEM systems. But the same
companies who are now partners are developing ca-
pabilities that could make them strong competitors in
the future.
In addition, the Asia-Pacific market has great long-
term potential, in spite of the recent economic troubles
in the region. This growth presents enormous oppor-
tunities for U.S. companies to expand into new mar-
kets, but the growth of Asia as a major market is also
a possible threat to U.S. companies. If other Asian
countries follow Japan’s mercantilist trade and invest-
ment policies, U.S. companies could find the region a
very difficult place to do business. The innovative mar-
keting strategies of U.S. PC makers often are not easily
implemented in Asian markets, and they are forced to
play by the rules set by domestic competitors. After a
brief surge in market share in Japan, U.S. companies
have seen their gains eroded by aggressive price com-
petition and control of distribution channels by Japa-
nese PC makers. The Korean market is almost entirely
controlled by Korean companies, who dominate the
local distribution channels. China is already the
world’s third largest PC market, and it has proven to
be a treacherous environment for U.S. companies. The
combination of government interference and the lack
of strong legal structures (such as contract enforce-
ment) and intellectual property protection put outsid-
ers at a disadvantage.
On balance, we would argue that the opportunities
outweigh the threats. U.S. companies in increasing-
returns markets win whenever the market grows, so
they benefit from the availability of low-cost hardware
made in Asia and from the growth of the Asian market.
The competition in decreasing-returns businesses is
mostly a war among Asian companies, with at least
some U.S. companies enjoying the spoils. As one Asian
executive put it, “We’re all killing ourselves to make
money for Microsoft and Intel.”
For those companies in hybrid markets, the rapid
growth offered by Asia compensates at least in part for
the increased competition from the region. And while
U.S. companies struggle to compete with domestic
companies in some Asian markets, their Asian com-
petitors face the same difficulties outside their home
markets. Japanese and Korean PC makers have had
limited success in other Asian markets, while Compaq,
IBM, and Hewlett-Packard have a strong presence
throughout the region. As for other Asian companies,
only Acer is a major competitor outside its home
market.
In spite of the generally positive assessment of the
U.S. position in the global computer industry, it would
be a mistake for U.S. companies to take their eyes off
Asia as a source of future competition. It is easy to
dismiss Asia as a region of imitators and ignore the
very real progress its countries and companies have
already made in improving their technological capa-
bilities. Thousands of Asian engineers have been
trained in U.S. universities, and while many of them
remain in the U.S.—providing a vital supply of human
resources—they retain strong contacts to their home
countries. Likewise, many of Asia’s computer compa-
nies are headed by people who cut their teeth working
for U.S. companies, and they know very well what it
takes to compete in the U.S. market.
The history of the consumer electronics, semicon-
ductor, and automobile industries serve as a warning
to U.S. companies that ignore Asia as a competitive
threat. This threat might not show up in the next few
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years, but it will increase in the long run as more seg-
ments of the computer industry evolve into mature,
technologically stable businesses, playing to the
strengths of Asian competitors.
Finally, it would be a mistake to assume that Asians
are somehow unsuited to competing in the increasing-
returns, soft side of the business. The next Bill Gates
might be a teenager in China, ready to ride the wave
of growth in Asian markets and shift the balance of
industry power across the Pacific. If U.S. companies
become complacent, or fail to see possible challenges
from beyond the water’s edge, they risk an unpleasant
surprise from across the Pacific.3
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